DPRK.
– What are the assumptions driving results?
– What does Your results suggest?
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Solutions
A WMD-E campaign would balance key objectives and missions; strategic, operational, and tactical risks; and the joint forces needed to interdict, attack, and/or eliminate nuclear forces and sites quickly enough to minimize the risks of proliferation or use.
The WMD-E maneuver scheme could adopt one or a combination of the following approaches:
– a northward movement of U.S. ground forces and RoK allies across the DMZ along one or more axes of advance; (2) the introduction of forces from the sea on one or both coasts to reduce the distances that ground forces need to advance to reach priority nuclear WMD sites; and/or (3) air maneuver operations involving airborne or air assault forces directly assaulting the highest-priority sites, with other ground forces maneuvering to meet up with these forces, and joint SOF, air, and naval forces supporting.
Answer
Each of the three approaches listed above involves associated benefits and risks.
For example, a northward advance would establish secure areas for elimination operations but could also be quite slow, and such an advance could well face the greatest concentration of opposing DPRK forces – hence, the highest casualties, especially if those DPRK forces had the ability and will to fight.
The approach based on operationally maneuvering from the sea could also face stiff opposition, and it would introduce some logistical challenges, but it would also shorten the distances – and potentially the time – that maneuver and WMD-E TFs have to advance to key DPRK nuclear and missile sites in the north.
Finally,
Figure 1.1
might be the fastest way to seize DPRK nuclear sites until the WMD-E TFs arrive, but this approach could leave the assault forces exposed and isolated. Trade-offs between risks and timelines also exist:
Some risks might be mitigated, for example, by conducting heliborne assault opera-tions against a site only when heavier ground maneuver forces are closing on that site so that assaulting forces can be quickly reinforced.
Question 2
2. Intelligence Requirements.
The quality and reliability of U.S. intelligence will be critical in winnowing the number of sites to be initially assaulted, seized, and secured down to those that will best reduce the risk of WMD being leaked or employed.
For example, poorintelligence can result in forces being sent to seize and secure sites bereft of WMD
Very good intelligence could, in theory, reduce the number of sites requiring coverage, support the efficient allocation of limited resources, and reduce risk. (In practice, however, North Korean efforts to hide weapons and disguise sites may significantly diminish the effectiveness of U.S. and allied intelligence.)
Twointelligence issues complicate planning for the WMD-E mission.
– First, intelligence gaps will likely mean that critical facilities rumored or reported to exist cannot be located.
– Second, as previously noted, many weapons – particularly CWs – are likely to have been dispersed tonumerous tacticaloperationalsites that cannot be identified in advance and are not included in estimates of a country’s WMD infrastructure.
Answer
For the WMD-E mission in North Korea, even in a DPRK collapse scenario, forces searching for WMD will not know what type of resistance they might encounter. TFs should consist, therefore, of both WMD specialists and general-purpose forces that are adequate for