The relationship between the US and its allies in Europe increasingly resembles the transactional type of interaction, a notion from the world of finance that means a concrete one-time deal. Until recently it was broadly used in the West to characterize the relations with Russia since 2014. In other words, it is a targeted cooperation on agreements, which the West is interested to strike with Russia, for example, the settlement of the Syrian and Ukrainian crises, the salvation of the Iran nuclear deal, some elements of the fight against international terrorism. This type of relationship was officially embodied in the “five guiding principles for EU–Russia relations”, adopted by the Council of the EU in March 2016. These days, the cooperation between the leaders of the Western world with its other representatives is becoming transactional as well.

Trump's way of thinking represents a strategy of a business manager, who primarily is interested in profitability of the enterprise. To be more precise, that is a type of profitability associated with the principles of shareholder economy (the interests of a narrow group of people focused on short-term benefits) in contrast with stakeholder economy. The shareholders for Trump are his electorate and the interests of Trump’s opponents and other members of the Western community become irrelevant. Trump offers a type of a business model, which envisages taking into account as much interests of the US allies as is acceptable for the America’s national interests, interpreted through a prism of Trump’s election promises. And most of them are interpreted in a narrow economy-centered context.

The political landscape of Europe is undergoing a profound change. The drama of Brexit, the US withdrawal from the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal, the fiasco of the G7 summit in Quebec, the intensifying trade war between the US and the EU, new populist governments, this time in Italy, the Catalan and Scottish separatisms, the EU internal quarrels on migration, the solidifying success of “Nord Stream 2” are symptoms of deep shifts in international relations. In general, the ongoing events confirm the emergence of the polycentric model of global governance. They also point to growing awareness in the EU of the need of strategic autonomy. The Russian foreign policy acquires more space for maneuvering in different geopolitical directions.

Yuri Rubinski

Directeur du Centre d’études françaises à l’Institut de l’Europe, Académie des sciences de Russie

Le dernier dirigeant soviétique, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, rêvait defaire du Vieux continent la pierre de touche d’un nouvel ordre international. Repoussé aux marges de l’Europe après l’avoir tant désirée, la Russie assume désormais sa “solitude géopolitique” et se voit comme un des centres actifs d’un monde multipolaire.

L’état des relations entre la Russie et l’Europe se fait parfois sentir à quelques sensations déplaisantes, comme un fourmillement dans les jambes, à force de patienter dans une antichambre du Conseil de la Fédération de Russie. Le sénateur Alekseï Pouchkov se méfie de la presse occidentale. “S’il s’agit de sélectionner une ou deux citations, vous n’avez que quinze minutes”, prévient-il en nous ouvrant son bureau, et dans un français impeccable. Connu pour animer depuis vingt ans l’émission politique Post-scriptum diffusée sur la chaîne de télévision moscovite TV-Centre, cet ancien président de la Commission des affaires étrangères de la Douma (chambre basse) se laissera interroger une heure et demie.