The association is beset with the simultaneous rise of traditional and non-traditional security challenges in global politics. Their Asia-Pacific aftereffects are exemplified, among other developments, by systemic escalations of North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue and the rise of ISIS threat in Southeast Asia. As long as the former is unresolved, for ASEAN the establishment of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Southeast Asia remains a remote possibility. Regarding the latter, the ISIS is expanding its activity from the Middle East to other regions, among which Southeast Asia with its large Muslim population, deep-rooted separatist sentiments and indigenous groups linking separatism and terrorism, is a perfect destination. The Russian top military officials, including the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, assess the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia as both real and growing41.

In this complicated context, the association aims to increase its influence upon the global development. The globalizing problems of the Southeast Asian territorial domain requires global solutions. At the same time, ASEAN’s attempts to explore the potential of intra-ASEAN cooperation, be it ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and other multilateral initiatives, have reached the maturity level and demonstrated limited efficiency in developing cooperation with ASEAN’s extra-regional partners. Among the latter, China’s example is worthy of note. After the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) the association encountered a growing trade deficit (strongly magnified by China’s mega-strategy the Belt and Road Initiative). Responding to this trend, the association has to incentivize its other extra-regional partners to increase trade and investment exchanges.

Contrary to ASEAN’s expectations, however, the response of these partners has come in the form of a politicized project rather than a headlong rush to invest in Southeast Asia. The revitalization of the Indo-Pacific region with a clear anti-Chinese agenda may well marginalize the ASEAN-led venues of multilateral dialogue.

The challenges presented by the afore-discussed developments raise a logical question: to what extent has ASEAN developed the safety mechanisms of its policy which will assist the association in its journey to the “brave digital world”? Stating that the foundation is shaky at best, it is expedient to specify what this emerging reality means for the association.

Outlining the influence of the presently evolving digitalization on ASEAN and its member states, the following points deserve distinguishing.

First, the global economy faces a kind of “productivity paradox”, as the exponential increase in technological development is not accompanied by the commensurate rise of productivity. Technologically advanced solutions, like gaming, interactive advertising, on-line shopping etc., focus on consumption and entertainment rather than production. For the ASEAN states, this scenario leads to a serious crisis of values as it undermines the East Asian work ethics as a pivotal prerequisite for new economic success stories.

Second, the Fourth Industrial Revolution incentivizes the association to seriously revise its formats and initiatives of economic regionalism. The present regulatory frameworks of multilateral trade, be it the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) were developed before the present digitalization of international trade. Accordingly, these frameworks do not grasp the present essence of digital products and services. This incentivizes the association to perform a double-edged task – to digitally support its multilateral economic initiatives and to upgrade their regulatory formats, both under serious time constraints.