According to many readers of his work, Descartes adhered to Aristotelian epistemology. He viewed the mind as a form of thinking in which physical objects are different, mental qualities are either definite or indefinite, and what seems real is necessarily related to what is possible. Descartes suggested that the object is a separate body, consisting of atoms of an undefined nature. Descartes rejected the monistic doctrine that mind and body are one because, in his opinion, two bodies without mind were not enough to explain the relationship between two people.
Descartes also believed that all entities, whether physical, mental, or both, are bound by «definite and implacable laws». He believed that no entity is completely independent, because the mind is not immune from the laws of the world. Body and mind are inseparable. Descartes believed that one can become aware of something that is not aware of itself. He suggested that one day the conscious mind will become aware of its true nature.
Without direct access to «other minds», we must, based on the behavior of others, conclude that their personal mental life is similar to ours. This conclusion became a kind of epistemic reflex. According to the philosopher John Searle, this has led to one of the most enduring beliefs in modern intellectual life: after all, we are not limited in our consciousness only by ourselves. This may not be the case. We have minds that are capable of performing truly intelligent reasoning and seeing things in truly mysterious ways, and they are probably superior to our own, and they too can be used to understand and improve our lives. They may not be as effective as we are. The only reasonable position on this issue is that our minds are as smart as possible, and in some ways better.
Take intelligence, for example. The fact that we, by and large, have minds equal in general capacity to our own is clearly not a good sign that these minds are similar enough to ours that we can have similar experiences or understand each other. As Searle put it, «To say that we are essentially ’the same animal’ in a certain respect means nothing at all». He has a simple answer to the seemingly outrageous assertion that we can know ourselves in relation to another human being, namely: «As for the assertion that we can know one human being in relation to another human being, I’m quite prepared to say, that such knowledge is absolutely useless».
You may not find this point of view entirely clear, but it is nonetheless an important finding, even if Searle is to qualify it with the remark that he is willing to discard it on the grounds that, being «similar enough», really useless, that is, it actually does not contribute to the accumulation of knowledge. You and I may be perfectly capable of doing intelligent things such as reading or listening, or making decisions on difficult, vague, and potentially conflicting issues, but our special abilities can never justify us, even in relation to someone who, in their queue, as smart as we are. Anyone who wants to claim that we are really equal or «are the same animals», after long and persistent reflection, had to come to the conclusion that our minds are radically different and simply fundamentally incomparable.
But here another interesting question arises. It would be easy to view this differentiation as proof that the human mind has abilities that we do not share with any animal. But Searle sees that is not the point.
It may seem that I have a little roughly characterized Searl ’s position as a position that is in the spirit of utilitarianism, as a determination to maximize the overall well-being of humanity. But he truly believes that this «sane maxim» should guide the thinking of everyone involved in a project to improve the well-being of people, from the highest courts to ordinary citizens, with the goal of building a future that will be as rich and interesting as the one we can imagine now. According to him, all those who followed Searle’s example and supported the project of theorizing about «collective unconscious» and «symbolic thinking» were forced to do so because they are convinced that they are looking for ways to expand human power. But it also means that they have to be willing to say no to certain things when they are faced with the opportunity to make humans more and more superior to other animals. It is an area of research that, he says, is not related to the question of whether we are «better» than other animals, but rather to how we should avoid «all possible threats to our own growth and the growth of our offspring, including threats our intellectual achievements».