Those gathered continued to listen intently.

– Here's another similar incident. Once at 8:50 a.m. computers in three U.S. command centers at once – in NORAD, in the Pentagon and in the Reserve Command Center in Maryland – sounded the alarm: "The United States has been subjected to a massive nuclear strike by the USSR. For the next six minutes, the fate of the world was decided. A Threat Assessment Commission consisting of senior officers from all three centers was immediately convened. ICBM launch sites received advance warning of the strike and instructions to prepare a retaliatory strike. Ten fighter-interceptors took to the air on alert, while others prepared for immediate departure. A so-called "doomsday plane" even took to the air, intended for the high command and the president, who would be able to command troops even if all ground command centers were destroyed.

The Threat Assessment Commission worked quickly and smoothly: all reports were cross-checked and data from long-range radar stations and space satellites were received, none of which confirmed the launch of even one Soviet missile. The system was rebooted and the alarm was declared false. The investigation revealed that the cause of the false alarm was a mistake by an Air Force command center officer who ran a training program simulating a full-scale Soviet attack on a computer included in the NORAD unified command system, which caused the general alarm. This possibility was later eliminated by physically separating the training and combat systems.

Yuri Vasilyevich spoke without stopping, confidently and clearly.

– Another similar case, again related to the NORAD center. One day, in the middle of the night, the computers of the Strategic Air Command and the Pentagon received messages from this center about the launch of missiles on U.S. territory. The counter of launched missiles suddenly changed its value and began to show 002 or 200 attacking missiles. The duty officers were alarmed, and an alert was declared. Pilots took their places in the bombers, the engines were started, the launching points of missiles "Minuteman" received instructions for a retaliatory strike. Minutes counted. A decision from the Risk Assessment Commission was required to launch a retaliatory attack. And the counter continued to go crazy – the "zeros" and "twos" kept changing places. This raised doubts about its serviceability. Then the control messages from the early detection stations were checked, which showed no threat. The alarm was canceled and the counter was reset. Three days later, the situation was exactly the same, and then the Commission was able to find the cause – it was a defective microchip in the computer system NORAD, costing only 46 cents, which arbitrarily changed the values of the counter because of a failure in its own electronic circuit. So a penny electronics could have destroyed the entire humanity… The point of my digression is to emphasize once again that the world is fragile, people are emotional, computer systems are imperfect.

There was another case on the subject of the nuclear suitcase. It was 1991, during Yeltsin's hunting trip to Zavidovo near Moscow. When we were sailing on a boat on the lake, one foreign guest kept looking at a black suitcase at the bottom of the boat. He thought it was nuclear. He tried to stay away from the suitcase, trying to sit on the edge of the boat. When they opened the suitcase on the island and took out two bottles of vodka and pickles, the guest laughed for a long time.